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What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orien-
tation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social constructionism
about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according to which the corre-
sponding kind is a social construction, that it, it is constituted by social factors and
practices. Social constructionism, then, is a version of realism about a kind that as-
serts that the kind is real, and puts forward a particular view about the nature of the
kind, namely, that it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social construc-
tivists about human kinds such as gender, race and sexual orientation oen make
an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are social constructions but they are
typically believed to be biological kinds (that is, people are typically wrong about
the nature of these kinds). Ron Mallon (2017) calls social constructions that are
(falsely) taken to be biological kinds covert social constructions.is paper is about
how we could have terms in our natural language that come to refer to covert social
constructions.
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What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual
orientation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social con-
structionism about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according
to which the corresponding property is a social construction, that it, it is
constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructionism, then, is
a version of realism about a kind that asserts that the kind is real, and puts
forward a particular view about the nature of the property, namely, that it is
constituted by social factors and practices.
Social constructivists about humankinds such as gender, race and sexual
orientation oen make an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are so-
cial constructions but they are typically believed to be biological kinds (that
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is, people are typically wrong about the nature of these kinds).1 RonMallon
(2017) calls social constructions that are (falsely) taken to be biological kinds
covert social constructions. is paper is about how we could have terms in
our natural language that come to refer to covert social constructions.
Mallon (2017) presents a challenge to the view that our terms for race,
gender, sexual orientation and other allegedly socially constructed kinds can
refer to covert social constructions. In what follows I will introduce the chal-
lenge, and I will develop and defend a solution to the challenge on behalf of
the social constructionist that can meet Mallon’s objections, or so I will ar-
gue.
Mallon’s challenge to the claim that terms such as “race,” “gender” and
“sexual orientation” refer to covert social constructions is the following, in a
nutshell: no matter what theory of reference we assume, there will be prob-
lems for the claim that those terms refer to covert social constructions. In
order to illustrate this point, I will explain the problem for the descriptivist
theory of reference and for the causal theory of reference.
First, the descriptivist theory asserts that a term T refers to an entity X
if and only if X satises the descriptions associated with term T . For this
reason, if we assume the descriptivist theory of reference, then terms such
as “gender,” “race” and “sexual orientations” will refer to covert social con-
structions only if these satisfy the descriptions associated with those terms.
But, and this is the crucial idea, if these are covert social constructions, this
is because ordinary speakers are typically wrong about their nature, that is,
they typically believe that the referents of those terms are not social con-
structions, and in particular they take them to be biologically signicant
kinds. erefore, it is dicult to see how those terms could refer to covert
social constructions, since this assumes that ordinary speakers do not asso-
ciate descriptions with those terms that capture the nature of the referent,
since the descriptions they do associate typically say that the referents are
biologically signicant kinds, but it is clear that covert social constructions
at issue here are not biologically signicant kinds, and therefore they do not
satisfy the corresponding descriptions. Hence, a descriptivist theory of ref-
erence cannot make sense of the claim that those terms refer to covert social
constructions (see Appiah 1996, Glasgow 2009).
In response to this worry, some social constructionists have appealed to
the causal-historical theory of reference in order to argue for the possibil-
ity that the corresponding terms refer to covert social constructions (e.g.,
Haslanger 2006). According to the causal-historical theory of reference, a
term T refers to an entity X if and only if X is at the beginning of a causal
chain of successive uses of the term, where the causal chain was originated
1 See for instance (Haslanger 2006), (Glasgow 2009) and (Stein 1999).
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with a baptism or dubbing of X as T . Even if some information about Xmay
be necessary in order to identify X so that the original speakers can associate
it with the term T , this term can then be passed on from speaker to speaker
without the need for these speakers to associate any identifying information
with the term, they just need to be part of the corresponding causal chain
(and at most, to have the intention to refer to the same thing that previ-
ous speakers are referring to). Because of this, social constructionists argue,
terms such as “gender” and “race” might refer to properties such as covert
social constructions even if ordinary speakers are wrong about the nature
of such referents, and in particular even if they believe falsely that they are
biologically signicant kinds, since speakers do not need to associate iden-
tifying descriptions with the term for the term to refer successfully. So the
causal-historical theory allows the possibility that the corresponding terms
might refer to covert social constructions aer all, in spite of the fact that
many ordinary speakers believe that gender and race are biologically signif-
icant kinds.
However, this view also faces diculties, according to Mallon.e cru-
cial idea is this: according to social constructionism, covert social construc-
tions are properties that are partially constituted by social practices, and in
particular, a social construction K is partially constituted by the social prac-
tices of labelling and classifying some individuals as K and treating them in
certainways because of being perceived asK. For this reason,Mallon argues,
if we go back to the initial baptism when a certain term T was introduced,
at that time the covert social construction could not have existed, precisely
because the kind is partially constituted by the term T itself, so there could
not be a preceding kind K for the term T to pick out. is is why appeal-
ing to the causal-historical theory of reference is problematic for social con-
structionists. Mallon calls this the missing referent problem: if covert social
constructions are supposed to be partially constituted by the employment of
term T itself, then there could not be a social construction of that kind prior
to the introduction of term T , and then the original baptism could not have
occurred, so appealing to the causal-historical theory is moot.
Mallon discusses two possible responses to this problem, namely, the
idea that there was a referent aer all prior to the original baptism, and the
idea that even if there was no referent of the right kind at the time of the
original baptism, the referent of the corresponding terms has switched, so
that the terms have now come to refer to covert social constructions, as so-
cial constructionism has it. Mallon argues that none of these responses can
be successful. In response, I will argue that they can both work, and I will
provide a version of each option in order to show that there can be successful
defenses of social constructionism.
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1. Finding the missing referents
Can we say that there was a referent prior to introducing term T? And could
that referent be a covert social construction? Mallon mentions two possible
referents that could exist prior to introducing term T , namely, what he calls
thin natural kinds, and institutional kinds. Let me elaborate. in natural
kinds are supercial kinds, that is, kinds that appear in nature without the
need of human intervention (although theremight also be thin natural kinds
that are created by humans), and such that they are not explanatorily robust,
that is, they do not appear in many law-like generalizations. For instance,
kinds such as having such and such skin color, or such and such hair texture,
count as thin natural kinds. We can assume that these kinds were instanti-
ated prior to introducing the term “race,” so the term could have picked out
one of those thin natural kinds. But it is clear, Mallon argues, that this is the
wrong kind of referent for the social constructionist, since thin natural kinds
are dierent from covert social constructions: whereas social constructions
are constituted by social practices, thin natural kinds are not. At most, thin
natural kinds could have been caused by social practices, but they are not
constituted by social practices, so they cannot be covert social constructions
of the sort social constructionists identify with race or gender.
What about institutional kinds? Institutional kinds are, roughly, social
kinds that have been created by explicit conventions, such as money, Prime
Minister, Supreme Court, and university.2 Again, Mallon argues that institu-
tional kinds are the wrong kind of referent, since covert social constructions
are such that they are typically taken (falsely) to be biologically signicant
kinds, whereas institutional kinds are not usually taken to be biologically
signicant kinds. As Mallon argues, ordinary speakers are typically aware
of the nature of institutional kinds, since institutional kinds are created by
explicit assignments of functions, whereas covert social constructions are
supposed to be kinds such that ordinary speakers are wrong about their na-
ture.
I want to argue that there are further options for the social construction-
ist. In particular, a social constructionist that appeals to a causal-historical
theory of reference can explain how social kind terms can refer to covert
social constructions because there could be social constructions prior to in-
troducing the corresponding terms that are neither thin natural kinds nor
institutional kinds. In particular, the social constructions at issue here could
be a matter of social constructions that are not constituted by the employ-
ment of term (or concept) T , but they are nonetheless constituted by social
2 See (Searle 2009) and (Guala 2016), among others, for further discussion about the nature
of institutional kinds.
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practices that do not involve employment of the term. Here it will be use-
ful to distinguish between social constructions that are constituted by social
practices in general, and social constructions that are constituted (at least
in part) by the employment of concepts or terms that aim to refer to those
very social constructions.3 Examples of the latter are kinds such as “Prime
Minister” and “Supreme Court”: these social kinds are partially constituted
by the employment of the corresponding terms. It can be argued that when
the terms are introduced, the corresponding social kinds are thereby cre-
ated.e introduction of the term and the bringing about of the social kind
occur at the same time, and this is how the social kind can be partially con-
stituted by the employment of the very same term. But as we have seen, these
kinds are very dierent from covert social constructions. Indeed, these so-
cial kinds that are partially constituted by the very terms are typically overt
social constructions, so they cannot be of help here.
But not all social kinds are constituted by the very same concepts and
terms that are introduced when the social kinds are created. In particular,
there are social kinds that are constituted by social practices that do not in-
volve terms or concepts that are introduced with the intention of referring
to them and because of this, social kinds of this sort could have existed prior
to the original baptism. For instance, social kinds such as ination or racism
could exist before the corresponding terms “ination” and “racism” were in-
troduced (omasson 2003). at is, these social kinds are constituted by
complex social practices that do not involve the employment of those very
terms or concepts (but they probably involve the employment ofmany other
concepts). For this reason, we can imagine ceremonies of original baptism
where these terms were introduced, so that they came to refer to ination
and racism given that these social kinds existed prior to the naming cere-
monies.
Canwe say something similar about gender and race?e viewwould be
as follows: gender and race would have to be identied with social kinds that
do not involve the employment of the terms “gender” and “race” themselves.
Whatwould these social kinds look like? Iwill focus on the case of “race.” We
could argue that before the term “race” was introduced, there were already
social constructions in the vicinity, namely, there were groups of people with
certain ancestors in common, or with certain geographical origins, that were
treated in a privileged or a subordinated manner in virtue of having those
features. And this is in itself a socially constructed kind. at is to say, the
social kind at issue here is not the property of being treated in a certain way
because of being classied as a member of a certain race.is social kind is
indeed partially constituted by the concept of race itself.
3 See (Díaz-León 2018) for further discussion of this distinction.
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But my view appeals to a slightly dierent socially constructed property,
namely, the property of being treated in a privileged or subordinated man-
ner because of being perceived to be part of a certain geographical group, or
because of (being perceived as) having certain skin color, or having certain
ancestors in common, or some other supercial features.4 None of these
social practices presupposes the employment of racial concepts. Given the
prior existence of these socially constructed kinds, we can now understand
what is going on at the original baptism ceremony. e introducers of the
term “race” might have had the intention of referring to those groups that
were treated in such and such manner because of their geographical origin
(or some other supercial feature), but theymight have the additional (false)
belief that such treatment was justied because the members of each group
also shared certain underlying biological properties that justied the privi-
lege or discrimination.5 is explains why ordinary speakers associate race
terms with false beliefs, namely, the belief that races are biologically signif-
icant kinds. But the causal-historical theory of reference does not require
that ordinary speakers have correct beliefs about the referent: it is enough
that they are part of the right causal chain, and that there was a successful
act of original baptism.
Someone could wonder how the original baptism could be successful,
if the original speakers had false beliefs about the alleged referents (to wit,
the referents were actually covert social constructions whereas the speakers
who introduced the terms falsely believed that they were biologically signif-
icant kinds). e key condition here is that there is a kind in the vicinity of
the original baptism that was explanatorily robust enough so that it could
become the referent of the term. And it seems to me that when the origi-
nal speakers introduced the term with the intention of referring to certain
groups of people with such and such skin color and such and such geograph-
ical origins (or whatever was the relevant thin natural kind), whom they also
took to share biobehavioral essences that justied the dierential treatment
at the time (but did not really instantiate these underlying essential proper-
ties), then the referents could very well be the existing socially constructed
4 See (Díaz-León 2015) for a discussion of a similar social constructionist account of race.
5 In my view, this false belief can explain why the introducers of the term “race” were mo-
tivated to introduce a new term, in addition to the terms they already have for the thin
natural properties: there were groups of people with thin natural properties in common
who were privileged or discriminated in virtue of having those thin natural properties,
and in addition to this some people believed that such privilege or discrimination was
justied because those groups shared an underlying property in common, such as a bio-
logical essence. is justicatory aim is what explains the introduction of the new term
“race,” which happened to refer to those previously existing social properties, about which
people had false beliefs.
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properties of the sort I have described, since these are themost explanatorily
useful kind in the vicinity.6
A remaining worry is the following. It might be argued that on this view,
when racial terms are introduced for the rst time, the existing social proper-
ties in the vicinity already seem to be constituted in part by racial concepts,
since people had ways of describing those groups such as “groups of peo-
ple who shared thin natural properties such as phenotypic features or geo-
graphical origins or common ancestors, that are privileged or discriminated
in virtue of having those properties,” which already seems to encapsulate a
racial concept. is description seems very similar to the concept of race
that is introduced in the baptism ceremony according to this view, so why
are those social properties not constituted by racial concepts. My answer to
this worry is twofold. First, it could be argued that at themoment of the bap-
tism ceremony, the introducers of the term had the additional (false) belief
that the individuals of the groups also shared an underlying essential prop-
erty, such as a biobehavioral essence, that justied the dierential treatment.
is new belief might explain why there arises a new concept, although this
response is a bit tricky since strictly speaking the causal theory of reference
has it that the beliefs of the speakers are not part of the content of the concept
(nor the meaning of the term). erefore, the presence of this essentializ-
ing (false) belief would not make a dierence to the content of the concept,
and then we cannot explain why the baptism ceremony brings about the in-
troduction of racial concepts for the rst time. (at is to say, this response
might be compatiblewith a hybrid version of descriptivism that incorporates
elements of the causal theory, but not with the causal theory of reference it-
self.)
A second response that is more akin to the causal theory of reference
might be the following. Mark Sainsbury and Michael Tye (2012) have ar-
gued that concepts are individuated by their historical origins, not in virtue
of their semantic or epistemic content. So, two concepts might be distinct if
they have dierent origins, even if their semantic or epistemic content is the
6 Guido Löhr (2019) has similarly argued, in response to Mallon (2017), that our social kind
terms can refer to covert social constructions only if the covert social kinds are not con-
stituted by concepts aiming to refer to those very same social kinds. Löhr also claims that
this makes these social kinds mind-independent enough so that semantic externalism can
explain reference to them, but, as he acknowledges, these kinds are social constructions
precisely because they are constituted by social practices, including the employment of
many concepts and the entertainment of many beliefs, other than the concept referring
to the social kind in question, as I explain above, so they cannot be mind-independent
strictly speaking. Löhr (2019) also develops a very interesting account of how covert social
kinds can be stable enough so as to be the referents of our terms via the causal theory of
reference.
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same. According to this view, then, any concept referring to the relevant so-
cial groups that existed before the introduction of racial terms, and the con-
cept referring to the very same social groups expressed by the term “race”
introduced in the baptism ceremony, would be dierent concepts, to the ex-
tent that they have dierent historical origins, even if they are co-referential.
Hence, we have two dierent ways of distinguishing the relevant con-
cepts. First, on a view more akin to the descriptivist theory of reference, the
concepts are dierent because the associated beliefs are dierent. Second,
on a view more akin to originalism, the concepts are dierent because they
have dierent historical origins.
2. Reference switch
Alternatively, could we say that the referent of terms such as “race” has
switched over time?is is also a coherent possibility, or so I want to argue.
ere might be cases such that there were no socially constructed proper-
ties that were explanatorily robust enough so as to become the referents via
the original baptism. In these cases, there might be thin natural kinds in the
vicinity, and the corresponding gender or racial termsmight come to refer to
those, via the corresponding original baptism ceremonies. And then, aer
time, the individuals that belonged to those thin natural kinds might have
acquired new socially constructed properties, namely, socially constructed
properties that involve the employment of the corresponding terms or con-
cepts themselves. For instance, someone could argue that the term “race”
originally referred to thin natural kinds, but that aer a while, given the so-
cial practices of classifying people into racial groups and treating them with
privilege or discrimination in virtue of their racial group, then members of
these thin natural kinds acquired new properties, namely, the socially con-
structed property of being treated in a dierentway because of being taken to
belong to a racial group (that is, to fall under a racial concept). And it could
be argued that once these socially constructed properties became explana-
torily robust enough, they could have come to be the referents, via reference
switching, precisely because they becamemore explanatorily robust than the
thin natural kinds (since these thin natural kinds are not very explanatorily
robust, as we have explained above).
But how could this mechanism of reference switching work? According
toMallon, a clear case of reference switching was described by Gareth Evans
(1973), where he explained the case of “Madagascar.”is name used to refer
to a region of themainland ofAfrica, but apparently, whenMarco Polo heard
the natives use the name, he thought they were referring to the island that
is now called “Madagascar,” and the new use spread around. is is a case
of reference switching where Marco Polo had the intention of referring to
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the same entity as the previous speakers, but he had dierent beliefs that did
not match with the previous referent (such as “being an island”), and these
new beliefs somehow trumped the intention to refer to the same entity as
the previous speakers, and brought about a new grounding for the name,
so that it came to refer to a new entity. According to Mallon, this is a cru-
cial feature of reference switching, namely, there have to be new beliefs that
change the referent. But in the case of the view I sketched above, where racial
terms used to pick out thin natural kinds but they now pick out covert social
constructions, there has been no change of beliefs, precisely because these
social constructions are covert, that is, ordinary speakers typically believe
(wrongly) that races are biologically signicant kinds, and keep associating
this belief with the term “race.”
erefore, this view claims that the term “race” used to pick out thin nat-
ural kinds, and it now picks out covert socially constructions, where neither
of those is a biologically signicant kind, although ordinary speakers still as-
sociate the (false) belief that the referents are biologically signicant kinds.
What brought about this change of referent then, if there was no change of
beliefs whatsoever? It is true that this case is dierent from the Madagascar
case as discussed by Evans. In the racial case, according to my suggestion,
there is no change of beliefs: ordinary speakers keep associating false be-
liefs with the term “race,” namely, the belief that individuals who belong to
the same race share biobehavioral essences. Hence, what brings about the
change of reference is precisely the apparition of a more explanatorily ro-
bust social kind in the vicinity, namely, the socially constructed kind that
is partially constituted by the employment of the term “race” itself. Given
reference magnetism, the terms that x their referents by means of a causal
theory of reference have to refer to the most natural property in the vicinity
that captures the patterns of use of the term. If a new, more explanatorily
robust kind is created that equally well explains the patterns of use of the
term, this can become the referent of the term.7
As we have seen, then, there are good reasons to think that our gender
and racial terms might refer to covert social constructions aer all. Either
they came to refer to covert social constructions that existed prior to the
original baptism ceremonies, or the terms came to refer to covert social con-
structions via reference switching. We can therefore conclude that Mallon
does not pose good reasons to think that any of these options is untenable.
So covert social constructionism can live another day.
7 See (Sider 2017) for an interesting discussion of reference magnetism with respect to the
reference-xing of gender and racial terms and other social kind terms.
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